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Abstract 
This paper provides further evidence on the impact of crime on the job market using 
the time series data over the period 1980-2007 for Argentina. We also address 
methodological flaws by earlier crime studies by employing autoregressive distributed 
lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration advocated by Pesaran et al (2001). The results 
show that unemployment has a statistically positive effect on the crime rate, depending 
on the model used.  
 
 
Resumen 
Este trabajo provee evidencia del impacto del crimen en el mercado laboral utilizando 
series de tiempo en el periodo 1980-2007 para Argentina. Utilizamos la metodología 
de Autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) desarrollada por Pesaran et al (2001) para 
establecer la relación de cointegración entre las variables. Los resultados muestran 
que desempleo tiene un efecto significativo positivo sobre crimen, dependiendo del 
modelo utilizado.  
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1.  IN T R O D U C T I O N  
 
In July 2010 the Victimization Survey carried out by Universidad Torcuato Di Tella 
reports that 39% of the interviews families in 40 urban centers of Argentina were 
victims of a crime in the last 12 months. Even more, 26.5% of those families suffered a 
violent crime. These are the results of one of many opinion surveys, but they all have in 
common that crime is one of most important problems in Argentina.  
It is widely recognized that socioeconomic determinants influence crime rates. The link 
between unemployment and crime has been largely debated.  Becker postulated that 
unemployment is positively related to crime because when an individual is 
unemployed, the marginal return from legitimate earning activities are lower than 
before, hence one is more likely to engage in criminal activities. 
However, there have been a few attempts to establish causality between 
unemployment and crime rates in Argentine: unemployment may explain crime, but 
crime may also be detrimental to legal activities in the sense that affect economic 
agents’ decisions of, for example, how many resources to invest in human and non 
human capital. 
The present paper aims to contribute to this debate by using a time series approach in 
order to determine the dynamic relationship among crime rate and macro economic 
variables. In particular, we will employ an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL, 
henceforth) approach to cointegration and error correction models, to determine 
whether there is evidence of causality in the short and long run between unemployment 
and crime rates in Argentine from 1980 to 2007. In our best of knowledge, there is no 
study which deals with crime rates and has used a dynamic econometric model such 
as the ARDL approach, especially in Argentina context. 
An ARDL approach designed by Pesaran et al (2001), is employed to set the 
integration and cointegration status of the variables. We use this approach rather than 
Johansen`s since this method is more robust with small number of observations and 
with endogeneity of the variables. This paper aims to understand the links between 
crime and unemployment in Argentina, using annual data from 1980 to 2007, by means 
of ARDL. 
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This paper is structured as follows:  After the introduction, Section 2 reviews the 
empirical literature. Section 3 discusses the econometric methodology. Section 4 
presents the data. Section 5 shows the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2.  TH E O R E T I C AL  AN D  L I T E R AT U R E  RE V I E W   
 
The hypothesis that unemployment, income distribution, and other variables 
characterizing the economic environment of the region affects crime can be traced out 
to Adam Smith. But it was not until the seminal paper of Gary Becker in 1968 that the 
first models of economics of crime upsurge.  
Becker established that crime is an economically important activity and the decision to 
participate in it, is an economic choice taken by rational agents. This decision comes 
form a maximization problem in which agents have to compare costs and benefits of 
legal and illegal activities taking into accounts the probability of being arrested and 
punished. 
Theoretical literature of crime emphasize on two fundamental aspects: the deterrence 
effect, related to the probability of being arrested and of being condemned and the 
social and macroeconomic effect of environment which generates an atmosphere 
prone to crime, measured by variables such as the unemployment rate, income per 
capita, inequality in income distribution, education, among others. 
GDP per capita can also be important in the explanation of crime rate. An economic 
expansion (increase in GDP per capita) could reduce criminal activities but it can also 
make more attractive illegal activities since it presents better opportunities, although, 
the potential victims could neutralize this "richness" effect by destining more resources 
against crime (alarms, bars, etc.). So the expected sign of GDP per capita is 
ambiguous. In this context, it could be more appropriate the use of relative deprivation 
indicators (GINI coefficient)2 
There are numerous studies on the relationship between crime and inequality.  Many of 
these studies find that relative income impacts on crime (see Fajnzylber et al.,2002, 
Choe, 2008, Cerro and Meloni, 2001)). Hovewer other works fail to find a robust effect 
of inequality on crime (for instance, Neumayer, 2004).  
From a theoretical point of view education may affect the criminal decision through 
several channels. First, higher levels of educational attainment are associated with 
higher returns on the market increasing the opportunity cost of crime. As noted by 
Usher (1997) that education perpetuates the values of society, enculturates people to 
serve their communities and promotes the virtues of hard work and honesty. 
Furthermore, Lochner and Moretti (2004) indicate that schooling generates beyond the 
private return received by an individual. Recent research tends to support the view that 
education is negatively correlated to crime rate (Buonnano and Montolio, 2006; 
Buonnano and Leonida, 2006; Lochner and Moretti, 2004). Additionally, several studies 
show that criminals tend to be less educated and from poorer economic families than 
non criminals (Freeman (1994), Lochner (1999)) 
Unemployment rates measure the absence of legal income opportunities and are 
central part of criminiometric of the Becker-Ehrlich type models (Entorf and Spengler, 
2000). Unemployment, as it limits the rate of return of legal activities, is expected to 
increase illegal activities However, studies on the relation between crime and 
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unemployment conclude that the effect of unemployment on crime is ambiguous and 
appears to be very sensitive to econometric specification. Freeman (1994) and 
Imrohoroglu et al (2001) research support this finding. 
Freeman (1994) and Maciandaro (1999) set that the effect of job market on crime may 
be studied through time series, cross section and economic characteristic across 
people. Depending on the type of study performed it is likely to obtain different results 
(for instance, Witt et al (1998), Marselli and Vannini (2000)) 
Empirical applications for Argentina carried out by Kessler and Molinari (1997), Balbo 
and Posadas (1998) and Chambouleyrón and Willington (1998), show that socio-
economic variables are not significant or weakly significant to explain criminal behavior. 
On the other hand, Cerro and Meloni (1999) in a panel study find a significant and 
positive effect of unemployment on criminal activities. They also found an important 
deterrence effect measured by the probability of arrest and sentence. The deterrence 
effect is well documented for the US and Europe (Levitt, 1998; Edmark, 2005; Entorf 
and Spengler, 2000).   
The expected signs of deterrence variables are negative since they represent a cost to 
those who commits crimes. Therefore, as the rate of sentence and conviction 
increases, the crime rate is expected to decrease, ceteris paribus. Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky (2004) find a large deterrent effect of police on crime, by measuring the 
car thefts before and after an Argentinean exogenous event. 
All these papers emphasize the causal effect of socioeconomic and deterrence 
variables on crime rate. However, there have been few attempts to establish the role of 
criminal activities as explanatory variable and to establish causality between economic 
activities and crime: unemployment, for example, may explain crime, but crime may 
also be detrimental to legal activities in the sense that affect economic agents’ 
decisions. 
The first contributions were due to Knack and Keefer (1995), who studied the impact of 
property rights on economic growth using indicators provided by country risk evaluators 
to potential foreign investors. Mauro (1995) also finds that corruption lower investment, 
thereby lowering economic growth. 
Monte and Pagani (2001) for Italian dataset, Pshiva and Suarez (2006) for Colombia, 
Daniele and Marani (2008) for Italy, carried out different researches for different 
countries and periods but they all find that criminal activities have a detrimental effect 
on investment. 
On the other hand, Forni and Paba (2000) examine the impact of murder in Italy, as a 
proxy of organized crime, on employment, finding a strong effect. Later on and 
extending the dataset, Peri(2004) also find a negative effect of crime on employment 
growth. 
Cardenas (2007) studying the case of Colombia identifies that the deceleration of 
growth is a result of a reduction in productivity. At the same time, VAR and Granger 
Causality test results support the causal relationship between drug trafficking and 
violent crime and from crime to productivity. 
Mauro and Carmeci (2007), using data form Italian regions by means of ARDL 
approach suggest that crime has a negative long run effect on output level, rather than 
the other way round. 
Masih and Masih (1996) using Australian data within a multivariate cointegrated system 
establish the direction of causality by means of a Granger Causality test, but they 
couldn’t find an impact of crime on socioeconomic variables. Later Narayan and Smith 
(2004), also for Australia, examine Granger causality between different typologies of 
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crime and socioeconomic variables. The results depend on the crime typology and the 
socioeconomic variable. 
For the Malaysian case, Habibullah and Baharon (2008) find that the long run causal 
effect runs form economic activity to crime rates by means of an ARDL approach. On 
the other hand they fail to find causality neither in the long run nor in the short run 
among variables. 
Detotto and Pulina (2009) using data from Italy, analyses how a set of economic 
variables and deterrence variables affect criminal activity and highlight that crime is 
also detrimental to economic activities, by means on an ARDL approach. These 
findings are also sustained by a Granger Causality test, in the sense that crime 
typologies affect legal activities, reducing employment rate. 
 
3.  ME T H O D O L O G Y  
 
The model used in this paper assumes the following long-run relationship: 
 
tttt SENTGDPUNEMPCR   3210     [1] 
 where CR = crime rate per 10.000 pop, UNEMP= Unemployment rate, GDP = income 
per capita and SENT =sentences rate per total crime. εt is the classical error term. All 
variables are expressed in natural logarithms.  
The methodology employed here is borrowed from Pesaran et al. (2001). The choice of 
this methodology is based on several considerations: first, as shown by Pesaran et al 
(2001), this methodology yields consistent estimates of the long- run coefficients that 
are asymptotically normal irrespective of the underlying regressors are I(0) or I(1).   
Second, this technique provides unbiased estimates of the long run model and valid t-
statistics in presence of potential endogeneity of some regressors (Harris and Solis, 
2003). It has also better statistical properties than the two- step Engle and Granger 
approach as the unrestricted error correction model does not push the dynamics into 
the residual term (Banerjee et al., 1998). Finally, it has good small sample properties 
as compared to alternative econometric techniques, multivariate cointegration 
(Narayan, 2005).   
 
To implement this procedure, equation [1] is modeled as a conditional ARDL error 
correction model: 
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To get equation (2), one has to solve equation (1) for εt and lag the solution equation by 
one period.  Eq (2) is a representation of the ARLD approach to cointegration. 
The first step in the ARDL approach is to estimate Eq (2) by using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS). The second step is to test the presence of cointegration by restricting 
all the coefficients of the lagged level variables equal to zero. That is the null 
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hypothesis of cointegration (Ho: 04321   ), is tested against the alternative 
(H1: 0000 4321   ,,,  ) by an F test with a non-standard distribution. 
This test involves two asymptotic critical value bonds depending on the variables are 
I(0) or I(1) or a mixture of both. If the test statistic value exceeds their upper critical 
value, then there is evidence of cointegration, if below we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration and if it lies between bounds, inference is inconclusive. 
Once a long-run relationship has been established, equation (2) is estimated using an 
appropriate lag-selection criterion. The optimal lag lengths of the ARDL are selected by 
R bar criteria.  At the second stage of the ARDL cointegration procedure, it is also 
possible to obtain the ARDL representation of the error-correction model. To estimate 
the speed with which the dependent variable adjusts to independent variables within 
the bounds-testing approach, following Pesaran et al., the lagged-level variables in 
equation (2) are replaced by ecmt-1 as in equation (3): 
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A negative and statistically significant estimation of   not only represents the speed of 
adjustment but also provides an alternative means of supporting cointegration between 
the variables.  
The ARDL approach does not require the pretesting of the variables included in the 
model, for unit roots, unlike other techniques such as the Johansen approach (Pesaran 
et al., 2001).  However, we test for the presence of unit roots to exclude the possibility 
of I(2) variables. In presence of such variables, the F test critical values are not more 
valid because they are based on the assumption that variables are I (0) or I(1).  
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) were used to test for 
unit roots in the variables. 
 
4.  DAT A  
 
Annual data for Argentina in the period 1980-2007 were used in the empirical analysis. 
GDP per capita3 (in constant pesos), and unemployment were extracted from the 
Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC). Data on reported Crime and 
Sentence come from Dirección Nacional de Política Criminal. Crime rates are defined 
as the number of reported offences per 10.000 inhabitants.  According to official 
statistics, the reported crime rate in Argentina increased 287 % in the period that span 
from 1980 to 2007, i.e., it increased at an average annual rate of 5.14%. However the 
growth rate was not even during the whole period. During the two deep crises 
Argentina went thought in this period, the 1989-1990 and 2001-2002; the crime rate 
grew faster, and reached a peak in 1989 of 202 crimes per 10000 inhabitants and in 
2002 of 358 crimes per 10000 inhabitants. 
After that it experienced a slight fall until 2007 when its value was 310. Unfortunately, 
statistics on crime are no longer available, but we conjecture that it has been 
increasing in the last years.4 Even more, the victimization survey of Universidad Di 
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4
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Tella, reports a victimization rate for 2008 of 28.4%, in 2009 of 34.1% and up to august 
2010, 33.3%.  
Argentina is a country characterized by huge volatility in its economic activity and in its 
judicial system. Analyzing the rate of crime in Argentina, we can identify different 
periods, that lead us think that deterrence and macroeconomic effect are both very 
important to explain crime.  
At the beginning of the 80’s, Argentina crime rate was very low. We conjecture that 
deterrence effect was quite strong, given that the country was under a Military 
Government regime. In 1983, with the upcoming of the democracy, important 
modifications took place in the Criminal Code (especially to laws 11179, 23050 and 
23057 and in 1984 the law 23077 was enacted) and in the Criminal Code Procedures 
(law 2372) that implied considerable reductions in the punishment to criminal activities. 
Consequently with those modifications we see sustained increases in the crime rate. 
On the other hand in 2003, some members of the Supreme Court were designed. 
Some of them were “garantistas” in the sense that relaxed penalties to criminal, 
especially to young people. We can observe that despite the huge economic recovery 
after 2001 crisis, the crime rate keeps high. 
On the other hand, we can observe that during recessions, especially those deep, 
crime rate peaks, which let us conjecture that crime is related to economic activity. 
 
Figure 1. Rate of Reported Crime (per 10.000 pop). Argentina 1980-2007 
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Source: Dirección Nacional de Política Criminal 
 
 
4.  EM P I R I C AL  RE S U L T S  
In this paper, we employed the Augmented Dickey Fuller-GLS test (ADF-GLS) 
proposed by Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) and the Philips-Perron to test the 
stationarity of the variables.5Unit root results are reported in Table 1. It comes out of 
these results that the conditions for applying the ARDL cointegration approach are 
satisfied. In other words, none of the variables included in equation (1) is I(2) or of 
greater order. 
                                                 
5
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the ones used in this paper 
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Table 1. Unit root results: Argentina 1980-2007 
Variables (all in log) Decision  
ADF-GLS 
(level) (1) 
Critical 
Value 
(2) 
Phillips 
Perron 
(PP) 
Critical 
Value 
(2) 
PP 
difference 
Crime Rate I(1) c,t,1 -2.903 -3.423 -1.556 -3.557 -3.81** 
Sentence Rate I(1) c,t,1 -2.186 -3.423 -2.071 -3.557 -3.88*** 
GDP per capita I(1) c,t,1 -2.466 -3.423 -1.312 -3.557 -3.67** 
Unemployment Rate I(1) c,1 -0.839 -2.463 -2.686 -2.944 -4.57*** 
Note: (1)Elliot, Rothenbert and Stock, 
(2) 95% simulated critical value using 28 obs and 1000 replications 
*, **, *** Significant at 10% , 5% and 1% respectively 
Constant (c), time trend (t) and order of lag 
 
 
Cointegration and Empirical Results 
We first test for the existence of a level relationship among the variables in the ARDL 
model, independently on the integration order of the variables. It can be seen from 
Table 2 that when causality is assumed from unemployment to crime, the F statistic 
indicates the presence of long run relationship. When causality is assumed to be in the 
opposite direction, there is also evidence of a stable long run relationship between both 
variables.  
 
 
Table 2.  ARDL Cointegration Test. Upper and lower bounds  
 
Dependent Variables (in First 
Differences) 
Statistic 
F (4,17) 
Conclusion 
Crime Rate 3.917 
Reject Ho at 
90% 
Sentence Rate 2.388 Accept Ho 
GDP per capita 3.167 Inconclusive 
Unemployment Rate 4.649 
Reject Ho at 
90% 
Note:  Ho: no long run relationship among variables. 
           Lags=1 
Critical Bounds-Case II* 95% 90% 
Upper Bound 4.049 3.574 
Lower Bound 2.850 2.425 
*Intercept and No Trend  
        
Critical Bounds are constructed by stochastic simulations using 20000  replications 
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We then estimate the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL)6.  In all models, we 
include interaction Dummies variables for the period 1999-2007 to control for structural 
break; these dummies are very significant in almost all cases.  
The long run coefficients of the regressions in the ARDL approach are presented in 
Table 3. The sign of GDP coefficient is negative but not significant. Unemployment has 
a positive and significant relationship, indicating that an increase in unemployment 
increases the rate of crime. There is also a negative and significant deterrence effect 
on the crime rate: an increase in the sentence rate decreases illegal activities. 
On the other hand, Table 3  does show no long run effect of crime on either GDPpc or 
Unemployment. 
 
 
Table 3. Long Run estimates: 1980-2007     
Dependent Variable 
Crime 
ARDL (2,2,1,2) 
t Ratio 
Unemployment  
ARDL (0,2,2,1) 
t Ratio) 
Crime   -2.457 -1.296 
GDPpc -0.276 -1.181 -7.939 -0.805 
Unemployment 0.249*** 5.092   
Sentence -0.437*** -7.575 -2.598 -1.079 
DCrime  -0.671   
DGDPpc -0.081 6.217   
DUnemployment 0.263*** 4.10   
DSentence 0.476*** 2.723   
constant 5.557** -1.181 -76.750 -0.98 
Notes: All variables in log 
 *    Significant at 10% 
 **  Significant at 5% 
 *** Significant at 1% 
ARDL lags order selected based on R-BAR Squared Criterion (crime, GDPpc, Unemployment, 
Sentence) 
D stands for dummy variable         
    
 
To complete the analysis it is also important to look at the results related to the short 
run dynamics. In this regard, the error correction representations for the respective 
selected ARDL models are presented in Table 4. All the terms in the estimated model 
are statistically significant (excepting unemployment) and with the expected sign. There 
is a short run dynamic that is significant in the crime rate explanation. In addition, the 
estimated coefficient of the error correction term is significant, thus confirming our 
previous results that there is a long run relationship between our variables.  
Furthermore, the magnitude of the estimate of the error correction term suggests a 
relatively high speed of adjustment from short run disequilibrium (1.042). 
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Table 4. Error Correction Representation for the Selected ARDL Model.              
Dependent Variable 
Delta 
Crime 
Delta  
Unemployment 
Delta Crime  -0.097 
DeltaCrime (- 1) 0.562** 1.188* 
DeltaGDPpc -0.907** -2.465*** 
DeltaGDPpc (-1) 0.820** 2.815*** 
DeltaUnemployment -0.116  
DeltaUnemployment(-1)  0.564** 
DeltaSentence -0.348*** 0.218 
DeltaSentence (-1) 0.211**  
DeltaDCrime   
DeltaDGDPpc -0.084  
DeltaDUnemployment 0.273**  
DeltaDSentence 0.496**  
ecm(-1) -1.042*** -0.039 
R-Bar-Squared 0.833  
D-W 2.048  
ecm= Crime+0.276*GDPpc-0.249*Unemployment+0.437*Sentence-
5.557 +0.081* DGDPpc-0.262* DUnemployment -0.476* DSentence 
ecm= Unemployment+7.939* GDPpc-2.457* Crime+2.599* Sentence-
76.75 
 Note: All variables in log 
           *    Significant at 10% 
           **   Significant at 5% 
           *** Significant at 1% 
 
 
The relationship between unemployment (as dependent variable) and crime is not clear. 
By one side, Table 2 shows a cointegration relationship, but according to Table 4 there 
is no long run relationship between unemployment and crime (the estimated coefficient 
is negative and not significant). Table IV also shows no relationship between these 
variables, neither in the long run nor in the sort run.  
 
 
Granger Causality Test 
 
The null hypothesis of this test is that a variable or a set of variables do not Granger 
cause another variable. Granger (2000) suggests including the error correction term to 
examine the potential short-term causality and long term equilibrium relations. Including 
the error correction term allow testing the long run equilibrium relationship.
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The main findings of the multivariate Granger causality test, are presented in Table 5. 
Unemployment and Crime lagged do Granger cause Crime. The ecm term is indicating a 
long run relationship. In the overall, we reject the non causality hypothesis. 
 
 
Table 5. Granger Causality Tests 
Dependent Variable 
Delta  
Crime 
 
Delta  
Unemployment 
 
Delta Crime (-1) 1.899***  
Delta Unemployment (-1) -0.363** 0.332 
Delta Unemployment (-2)  -0.160 
ecm (-1) -1.814***  
All F(3,26) 6.017*** 2.278 
Note: All variables in log 
         *    Significant at 10% 
         **  Significant at 5% 
         *** Significant at 1% 
 
 
However, neither Crime nor Unemployment lagged do Granger cause Unemployment, 
We could not find a long run relationship, given that the ecm term was not significant. 
We find that crime do not Granger Cause unemployment. 
 
 
V.  CO N C L U S I O N S  
 
It is widely recognized that socioeconomic determinants influence crime rates. The link 
between unemployment and crime has been largely debated.  However, there have 
been a few attempts to establish causality between unemployment and crime rates in 
Argentine: unemployment may explain crime, but crime may also be detrimental to 
legal activities in the sense that affect economic agents’ decisions. 
The present paper aimed to contribute to this debate by using a time series approach 
in order to determine the dynamic relationship among crime rate and macro economic 
variables. In particular, we will employ an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL, 
henceforth) approach to cointegration and error correction models, to determine 
whether there is evidence of causality in the short and long run between unemployment 
and crime rates in Argentine from 1980 to 2007. We use an ARDL approach rather 
than Johansen`s since this method is more robust with small number of observations 
and with endogeneity of the variables. 
Results do not let us conclude about the effect of crime on unemployment, since we 
obtained mixed results. 
In cointegration equation (Table II) we find a relationship in both directions.  In ARDL 
(Table 1A) we accept a relationship among variables, however only lagged once 
unemployment has a significant effect on crime, but not the other way round. 
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Lon run coefficients estimates by ARDL approach (Table III), we find a positive 
significant relationship from unemployment to crime, but not from crime to 
unemployment. 
Table IV, Error Correction Model reinforces that variables explain crime in the long run, 
but not unemployment, however short run dynamic is not clear. 
Lately Granger Causality test point to a relation of unemployment to crime but not the 
other way round. 
The main results are not as conclusive as those obtained by Masih and Masih (1996) 
for Australia, who found no relationship from crime to unemployment, nor those 
obtained by Mauro and Carmeci (2007), Detotto and Pulina (2009), for Italy, or for the 
Malaysian case (Habibullah and Baharon (2008)) who find a strong relationship from 
crime to unemployment.  Further research is needed to let us conclude about the 
dynamic relationship between crime and unemployment. 
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AP P E N D I X  
Table IA. Autoregressive Distributed Lag Estimates 
Dependent Variable 
Crime 
(2,2,1,2) 
Sentence 
(2,1,0,2) 
GDPpc 
(2,0,1,1) 
Unemployment  
(2,2,2,2) 
Sentence -0.348***
 
 0.145** -0.169 
Sentence(-1) 0.103 0.967*** -0.055 -0.15 
Sentence(-2) -0.210** -0.398  -0.344 
GDPpc -0.907** 0.844  -2.52*** 
GDPpc(-1) 1.439** -1.617** 1.247*** 5.695*** 
GDPpc(-2) -0.820**  -0.48*** -3.945*** 
Crime  -1.276*** -0.013 -0.974 
Crime(-1)  1.396*  0.920 
Crime(-2)  -0.852  -1.188* 
Unemployment -0.116 0.143 -0.147***  
Unemployment(-1) 0.375**  0.244*** 1.757*** 
Unemployment(-2)    -0.587*** 
DGDPpc -0.084  -0.159* 0.532 
D Crime   -0.103*  
D Sentence 0.495** -0.149   
D Unemployment 0.273**   0.275 
c 5.79** 8.728 2.249 10.522* 
Note: All variables in log 
         *    Significant at 10% 
         **  Significant at 5% 
         *** Significant at 1% 
    
 
 
 
 
Testing for existence of a level relationship among the variables in the ARDL model. 
Null hypothesis: no level effect 
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Dependent Variable F-statistic Null Hypothesis 
Crime 
(2,2,1,2) 
7.912 Reject at 95% 
Sentence 
(2,1,0,2) 
2.226 
Can´t be 
rejected 
GDPpc 
(2,0,1,1) 
2.584 
Can´t be 
rejected 
Unemployment 
(2,2,2,2) 
1.633 
Can´t be 
rejected 
 
 
Diagnostic Tests ( F Version) 
 
Test Statistics 
Crime 
(2,2,1,2) 
Sentence 
(2,1,0,2) 
GDPpc 
(2,0,1,1) 
Unemployment  
(2,2,2,2) 
Serial Correlation F(1,11)=0.067 F(1, 14)=5.291** F(1, 15)=0.567  F(1, 11)=0.003 
Functional Form F(1,11)=4.798* F(1, 14)= 0.049 F(1, 15)= 0.074 F(1, 11)= 0.184 
Heteroscedasticity F(1,24)=4.886** F(1, 24)=1.395 F(1, 24)=5.491** F(1, 24)= 0.111 
Note: *  Significant at 10% 
          **  Significant at 5% 
          *** Significant at 1% 
    
 
 
